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THE REMOTENESS DOCTRINE: A RATIONAL
LIMIT ON TORT LAW
Victor E. Schwartzt
An individual or corporation should be subject to liability when it is
negligent or commits a wrong that directly harms another. The effects of
any wrongful act, however, can reach beyond the person who is directly
hurt and adversely affect persons far removed from the event. At some
point, imposition of liability becomes too tenuous, too remote. In such
situations, the "remoteness doctrine" provides a rational limit on tort
law.'
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INTRODUCTION
The "remoteness doctrine" has been applied in two different con-
texts: attenuated harm cases and cases involving derivative claims. A
classic example of the doctrine's application to bar a claim involving an
attenuated harm is The Wagon Mound No. 1.2 In that case, a freighter
named the Wagon Mound carelessly discharged a large quantity of fur-
nace oil into the Port of Sydney, Australia. The oil quickly spread across
the bay and came into contact with the slipways of the plaintiff s wharf,
interfering with its use, but otherwise causing only nominal damage.
The oil suddenly ignited when cotton waste floating on the surface was
set fire by molten metal dropped from the wharf by the plaintiff's work-
men. The fire seriously damaged the wharf.
Although the defendant's wrongful act and the plaintiff s harm
could have been linked, the defendant was not held liable. In reaching its
decision, the court stated the remoteness doctrine with cellular clarity
2 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., Ltd. (the Wagon Mound),
[1961] AC 388 (P.C. 1961) (Eng.) (hereinafter "Wagon Mound No. 1").
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when it said that "there is no such thing as negligence in the air, so there
is no such thing as liability in the air.' 3
Another example of remoteness based on an attenuated harm is an
individual driving too fast because he is late for work. Suppose he
causes an accident on a major highway. The accident creates a huge, but
foreseeable, traffic jam. In the traffic jam is a doctor who fails to reach a
patient in time for emergency treatment. The patient dies. No court
would allow the decedent's family to recover in tort against the negligent
driver. The harm is simply too tenuous, too remote.
Other remoteness cases have involved unusual, but equally serious,
circumstances. In Oehler v. Davis,4 a dog collar manufacturer sold a
defective dog collar. The collar broke, allowing the dog to escape its
owner and bite someone. The court decided that the plaintiff had no
cause of action against the dog collar's manufacturer, because the harm
was too remote.5
In another case, a day care center negligently allowed a child to
consume poison. Relatives with whom the child was residing lost cus-
tody of the child, because bruises caused by the poisoning were mistaken
for the results of child abuse.6 The relatives sued the day care center,
alleging "extreme mental hardship, anguish and humiliation, loneliness
and disruption from the loss of the companionship of the child .... -7
The relatives' claim against the day care center for loss of custody was
dismissed, because it was too remote.8
In these examples, the remote harm was serious and often foresee-
able. Nevertheless, the connection between the harms and the wrongs
was deemed to be too tenuous for tort law to allow recovery.
The remoteness doctrine comes into play even more strongly when
the alleged harm is derivative in nature. For example, consider a
machine tool company that sells a defective product to an employer. As
a result, an employee is seriously injured and the employer, who pro-
vides worker compensation benefits, is forced to pay the employee's
medical expenses. A direct claim by the employer against the manufac-
turer would not be allowed because the harm to the employer, though
foreseeable, is too remote.9
3 Id.; see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) ("Proof of
negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.").
4 298 A.2d 895 (Pa. Super. 1972).
5 See Oehler v. Davis, 298 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa. Super. 1972).
6 See Lewis v. Kehoc Academy, 346 So. 2d 289, 291 (La. App. 1977).
7Id.
8 See id. at 292-93.
9 Tort law, however, does permit the employer to recover for certain types of economic
harm, such as worker's compensation costs or medical expenses paid on behalf of the employ-
ees, through the process of subrogation. The employer can join in the employee's tort claim
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I. HISTORY OF THE REMOTENESS DOCTRINE -
ITS APPLICATION
The roots of the remoteness doctrine in American law have been
traced back to Anthony v. Slaid,10 where the plaintiff, by contract and for
a fee, agreed to provide reasonable support to all the paupers in town for
a specified period of time. The defendant assaulted a pauper, directly
causing him significant injuries, and also causing the plaintiff an indirect
(or derivative) economic loss. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts rejected the plaintiffs claim as too remote. Over 150 years later,
the Supreme Court of the United States still cites this principle with
approval.'1
Judges have searched for traditional doctrinal concepts to explain
remoteness, in both attenuated harm and derivative cases. Sometimes,
the concept of "proximate cause" is cited in support of the doctrine be-
cause proximate cause embraces a public policy element which, in some
instances, limits claims, even though there was a clear cause-in-fact rela-
tionship between the defendant's wrongful act and the plaintiff's alleged
harm. Other times, the concepts of "standing" or "duty" are used to ex-
plain the remoteness doctrine. Both of these doctrines embrace a public
policy element. 12
As Professors Prosser and Keeton state in their treatise: "[I]n negli-
gence cases, the duty is always the same - to conform to the legal stan-
dard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk."'13 Types of
harm not sufficiently close to the negligent or wrongful act (e.g., an eco-
nomic loss that is indirectly related to a direct personal injury) may be
beyond the scope of a duty owed.
against the manufacturer of the machine tool, but the employer's claim can be no greater than
that of the employee. It is a firmly established rule of tort law that one who pays expenses on
behalf of another does not have standing to bring a separate and distinct claim against the
original tortfeasor. See ARTmnR LARSON & LEx K. LARSoN, 2 LARsoN's WORKERs' CoMNPEN-
SATION § 74 (Desk ed. 1999) (discussing the mechanics of subrogation).
1O 52 Mass. 290 (1846).
11 See Associated General Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 532-33 n.25 (1983) (stating the general principle on damages that
"'where the plaintiff sustains injury from the defendant's conduct to a third person, [the plain-
tiff's cause of action] is too remote ....") (emphasis original).
12 See RESTATEMENr (TRD) op TORTS: GENERAL PINcxPLEs 85 (Council Draft No. 1,
Sept. 25, 1998); see also International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 734 Health and Wel-
fare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 34 F. Supp.2d. 656, 661 (N.D. IM. 1998) (noting that
"the remoteness doctrine involves public policy concerns which are determined as a matter of
law, and not fact, completely unrelated to factual or proximate causation"); Iowa v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Iowa 1998) ("The remoteness doctrine 'is not based upon
a factual inquiry to determine whether the damages claimed were foreseeable or whether they
were a proximate cause; rather it is a legal doctrine incorporating public policy
considerations.").
13 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEnTON ON ThE LAW OF ToRTs § 53, at
356 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
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Whatever conceptual vehicle is utilized - proximate cause or duty
- the remoteness limitation on liability has endured as a basic doctrine
of tort law. Occasionally, however, courts have demonstrated an unfor-
tunate willingness to discard basic doctrines of tort law to go after "un-
popular" defendants. For example, in the 1980s, some courts imposed
unprecedented, absolute liability against unpopular defendants who had
manufactured products containing asbestos and failed to warn the public
about health dangers that were later associated with these products. 14 As
wisdom prevailed, these cases were overruled or modified by the courts
themselves or by legislatures. 15
But history can repeat itself. Basic fairness suggests that the doc-
trine should be applied in the same way to all defendants; however,
courts may feel pressure to undermine the remoteness doctrine with re-
spect to unpopular defendants. 16 Any distortion of well-established prin-
ciples of law to target unpopular defendants can, and will, migrate to
others. If the doctrine is destroyed, remote liability may attach to per-
sons who do not have the "remotest" idea that they could one day be held
liable for their actions. 17
By definition, the remoteness doctrine is not applied in a precise,
mechanical way, but a long history of case law supports its application.
This article will describe and analyze several common factors that sup-
port the remoteness doctrine in cases involving either attenuated or deriv-
ative claims. The article will also analyze the remoteness doctrine's
rationale and consider it conceptually, from the point of view of both
14 See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 1982)
(holding that medical community's presumed unawareness of the dangers of asbestos was
irrelevant in failure to warn case); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 114
(La. 1986) ("A manufacturer or supplier who sells a product with a construction or composi-
tion flaw is subject to liability without proof that there was any negligence on its part in
creating or failing to discover the flaw.").
15 For example, Beshada and Halphen were modified by legislation stating that courts
are to take into account the manufacturer's warning that accompanied the product. See N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2A:58C-3(3) (1987) (stating that the manufacturer of a product that was alleg-
edly designed in a defective manner shall not be liable if "[t]he harm was caused by an un-
avoidably unsafe aspect of the product and the product was accompanied by an adequate
warning"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56(2) (1988) (stating that "[ain adequate warning
about a product shall be considered in evaluating the likelihood of damage when the manufac-
turer has used reasonable care to provide the adequate warning to users and handlers of the
product.").
16 See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Pivotal Trial Pits Gun Victims Against Industry, WALL. ST.
J., Jan. 4, 1999, at A13, A15 (reporting on case presenting novel theory that gun manufacturers
could be liable for negligent failure to supervise distribution of their products).
17 See William H. Pryor, Jr. et al., Report of the Task Force on Tobacco Litigation Sub-
mitted to Governor James and Attorney General Sessions, 27 CtrMB. L. REv. 577, 637 (1996)
("[W]e strongly suspect that a lawsuit against tobacco companies would provide aid and com-
fort to those who want to sue other firms that sell products that have been linked to health risks
[, such as the manufacturers of alcohol].").
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proximate cause and duty. Finally, this article will examine the applica-
tion of the doctrine with respect to today's unpopular defendants.
II. FACTORS THAT SUPPORT THE REMOTENESS DOCTRINE
A. INTERVENING AcTs BETWEEN DEFENDANT'S CoNDucr AND
PLAINTIFF'S INJURY
While the remoteness doctrine is not based simply on distances in
time or space, it is more likely to apply when there have been independ-
ent intervening acts between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's
alleged injury. This occurs most frequently in cases involving attenuated
harms.
For example, in The Wagon Mound No. 1,18 an intervening act oc-
curred when molten metal was dropped into furnace oil on the water. It
was highly unlikely that the furnace oil would ignite, because that type of
oil has an extremely high "flash point." Plaintiff's act of dropping the
molten metal was an independent act that occurred after defendant's neg-
ligent conduct took place. It contributed to the "remoteness" of the
harm.
In another famous case, Petition of Kinsman Transit Co.,19 employ-
ees of Kinsman Transit Company negligently and improperly moored a
ship, the Shivas, at a dock owned by the Continental Grain Company in
the Buffalo River at a point about three miles above a lift bridge operated
by the City of Buffalo. It was late January, and the river, winding and
about 200 feet wide; was full of floating ice, which was moving with a
rapid current. Ice and debris accumulated, building a wedge between the
ship and the dock. Pressure from the wedge snapped the mooring lines
and pulled out an improperly anchored mooring block. The Shivas broke
loose and floated downstream, where it collided with another ship, the
Tewksbury. The collision snapped the Tewksbury from its moorings,
and the two ships went down the river together. Frantic telephone calls
were placed to city workers to have them raise the bridge. The phone
calls went unanswered because one bridge crew had gone off duty and
another was late in arriving. By the time the second crew began to raise
the drawbridge, it was too late. The ships crashed into the center of the
bridge and caused it to collapse.
The bridge collapse affected owners of wheat stored aboard a ship
berthed in the Buffalo harbor below the bridge. Because of the accident,
their ship could not be moved and unloaded at the shipper's grain eleva-
tors located upstream of the collapsed bridge. The shipper was put to
18 [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C. 1961) (Eng.).
19 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
THE REMOTENESS DocTRiwE
considerable additional expense for extra transportation and storage costs
and for the purchase of replacement wheat.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming a lower court rul-
ing, held that "the injuries to [the shippers] were too 'remote' or 'indi-
rect' a consequence of defendant's negligence" to create liability.20 This
was true even though the court found that it was "foreseeable" that the
defendant's negligence could lead to indirect economic loss.2 '
B. THE PossmILrry OF DupLICATE RECOVERY FOR THE SAME HARM
The remoteness doctrine is also supported by the need to avoid du-
plicative recoveries for what is in essence a single harm.22 This is espe-
cially important in cases involving derivative claims. For example, if a
defective product in the workplace injures an employee, health care costs
and pain and suffering can be essential parts of the employee's product
liability claim. If the employer were also allowed a direct and separate
cause of action against the manufacturer of the product to recoup wages
and health benefits paid to the employee as worker compensation, the
manufacturer could be forced to pay twice for the same harms.
Duplication could arise in the employee's product liability suit be-
cause the jury would not know that the employer had also reimbursed the
plaintiff. The collateral source rule, which is still the law in most states,
would keep the jury from being apprised of that fact.23 Further, if the
employer had a separate claim, that jury would not necessarily know that
a previous award had been made to the worker for his or her medical
costs.
It is fundamentally unfair for defendants to pay twice for the same
harm - indeed, in the above example, for the same medical expenses.
This potential for duplicate recovery has led courts to vest control of a
cause of action in the hands of the person who has been directly injured.
Indirect claims alleging economic loss are left to subrogation.
20 lI at 824.
21 See id
22 See generally Southeast Fla. Laborers Dist. Health Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Mor-
ris, 1998 WL 186878, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 1998) ("[T]he risks of multiple recoveries is
real."); Seafarers Welfare Plan v. Philip Morris, Inc., 27 F. Supp.2d 623, 632 (D. Md. 1998)
(noting that "there is a definite risk of multiple recoveries in this case if plaintiffs are allowed
to proceed."); International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 734 Health and Welfare Trust
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 34 F. Supp.2d. 656, 662 (N.D. IMI. 1998) (indicating that "an
equally compelling basis for dismissal is the substantial risk of double recovery posed by class
action suits which could be brought by the individual members based on their personal
injuries").
23 See generally John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in
Tort Law, 54 CALF. L. REv. 1478, 1478 (1966) ("[Tihe 'collateral source rule' . . . ordains
that, in computing damages against a tortfeasor, no reduction be allowed on account of bene-
fits received by the plaintiff from other sources, even though they have partially or wholly
mitigated his loss.").
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C. THE REMOTENESS DoCRINm PREvENTs AN AVALANCHE OF
CLAIMS
Consider the hypothetical highway accident caused by a negligent
driver.24 Should people who are delayed by that accident be allowed to
bring suit for the harms they suffered? In a traffic jam, hundreds of peo-
ple, sometimes thousands, may be delayed, and virtually all will suffer
some type of harm - people are delayed for appointments, they miss
business opportunities, and they suffer anxiety. In some situations, phys-
ical harm may result, but the claims are still deemed too remote. There is
no liability in such cases.
In actions involving derivative harms, concern about an avalanche
of claims is also present. As discussed infra,25 the initial suits brought
by state attorneys general to recoup payments relating to medical assist-
ance for alleged tobacco-related injuries produced a tidal wave of litiga-
tion. When states realized that settlements may be obtained, more claims
were filed. Soon, cities, taxpayers, union health and welfare funds, Blue
Cross/Blue Shield entities, self-insured employers, Native American In-
dian tribes, and even several foreign governments filed claims.
D. INDIRECT ECONOMIC HARM SUGGESTS REMOTENESS
When the plaintiff alleges a derivative claim (i.e., an indirect eco-
nomic harm), remoteness concerns are present. For example, in cases
like the hypothetical about the defective workplace product,26 courts
have generally been unwilling to allow the employer to bring a direct
action against the product's manufacturer to recover lost profits and the
cost of medical care for the employee. 27 This is true even though the
defendant's conduct may have resulted in serious injury. In this context,
the risk of an avalanche of claims is obvious. Anything that would po-
tentially injure an employee or cause the employee to take time off from
work could be said to "harm" the employer.
24 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
25 See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
26 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
27 The concept of "transferred intent" has been supplied to permit recovery in remote
instances when a defendant's conduct has been purposeful or malicious and the plaintiff suf-
fered physical harm, but not when the plaintiff has endured merely indirect economic loss. See
JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIAIS ON TORTS
29 (8th ed. 1988) (if someone throws a rock at A and hits B who was hidden in the woods, B
has a claim).'
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III. LEGAL RATIONALE FOR THE REMOTENESS DOCTRINE
A. PROXIMATE CAUSE
Many courts have utilized the concept of "proximate cause" or
"legal cause" as a conceptual explanation for the remoteness doctrine.
These courts appreciate that there is an important and vital distinction
between cause-in-fact ("but for" causation) and proximate cause. If one
were merely to ask: "Would the plaintiff have been injured if the defend-
ant had not engaged in negligent or wrongful activity?," thousands of
claims could be produced. Tort law has clearly rejected "cause-in-fact"
as the sole limitation on whether a defendant will be deemed liable for
another's harm.
Courts answering the question of whether a defendant's conduct
will be deemed actionable under a "proximate" or "legal" cause analysis
have considered factors such as the existence of intervening acts between
the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm, the indirectness of the
harm, and the lack of foreseeability of the harm to justify holding that a
defendant's conduct, however negligent or wrongful, was too "remote"
and, therefore, not the "proximate cause" of the plaintiff's harm. These
courts have also made public policy choices about whether the defend-
ant's conduct was important enough in its causal relationship with the
plaintiff's harm to warrant the imposition of liability.
B. LIMITED DUTY
Duty limitations also help to explain the remoteness doctrine.
Judges who have embraced the remoteness doctrine, either because of
concerns about duplicate recovery, concerns about creating an avalanche
of new claims, or because the plaintiff suffered an indirect economic
harm, have at times explained their result by stating that a defendant did
not breach a "duty" to the plaintiff.
"Duty" is a question of law, not of fact; and in the context of deriva-
tive suits, it is not tied to the concept of foreseeability. In using a duty
rationale, a court can explain why the line on liability should be drawn at
a certain point. As the draft Restatement (Third) Of Torts: General Prin-
ciples makes clear:
There are ... situations in which the requirements
of negligence, legal causation, and physical harm can be
satisfied, but in which for reasons of principle or policy,
the imposition of liability seems plainly troublesome. In
1999]
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such cases, judicial screening of the plaintiffs claim,
under the heading of duty, is appropriate. 28
IV. THE REMOTENESS DOCTRINE AND
"UNPOPULAR" DEFENDANTS
A. ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARms
When the defendant is a manufacturer of alcoholic beverages, fire-
arms, or tobacco products, some courts may be tempted to forego 200
years of legal history and abandon the remoteness doctrine.
For example, a judge may firmly believe that alcoholic beverages
cause tremendous harm and provide little or no benefit to society. The
judge may have experienced the devastation of alcoholism in his or her
own family. Maybe a drunk driver killed a close friend or relative. The
judge may be shocked by advertisements that appear to glamorize alco-
hol use and entice young people to use products containing alcohol.
Now, imagine that a state attorney general in that judge's courtroom
is seeking to recover medical costs to the state allegedly "caused" by
alcohol abuse. The state's claim is derived from harms to individual
consumers of products containing alcohol, and from individuals injured
by such persons.
The attorney general details the costs to the state to treat just one
person - a young mother who was the victim of an accident caused by a
drunk driver who had a history of drunk driving arrests. The attorney
general "estimates" that long-term medical and related costs to the state,
in this one incident, may exceed $2 million. Further, the attorney general
presents "data" to show the alleged total cost of alcohol abuse to the
state. This data includes not only costs created by drunk drivers, but also
Medicaid expenditures "caused" by alcohol-related diseases. It also in-
cludes costs to the welfare system that the attorney general concludes
would never have occurred if persons on welfare were not "addicted" to
alcohol. The "estimated" costs are now in the hundreds of millions of
dollars.
Under any traditional analysis, all of the attorney general's claims
would be deemed "too 'remote' or 'indirect' a consequence of defend-
ant's negligence" to create liability, because they are derivative. 29 Nev-
ertheless, one can see how the judge in the example would be tempted to
"adjust" the law and allow the attorney general's claim.
Likewise, some may hold the opinion that certain firearms, espe-
cially assault weapons and "Saturday Night Special" handguns, serve no
28 See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINcn'LES 45 (Council Draft No. 1,
Sept. 25, 1998).
29 See Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1968).
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useful purpose to society. Recently, the City of New Orleans filed suit
against gun makers to recoup costs the city allegedly incurred because of
the illegal use of firearms.30 Other major cities, including Chicago and
Philadelphia, have filed similar lawsuits.31 These claims have stirred
great emotional feelings.32
Under a traditional tort law analysis, such gun litigation would not
stand. Both the derivative nature of many of the asserted injuries and the
presence of significant intervening causes weigh heavily in favor of find-
ing such claims remote. If emotion were to overcome law, however, the
fact that manufacturers of certain firearms are "unpopular" might cause
judges to cast aside the remoteness doctrine, seize upon a new liability
theory, and allow a claim.
We have seen a preview of potential future claims against manufac-
turers of alcoholic beverages and guns in litigation involving tobacco
products - perhaps the most vilified of any legal product currently sold
in the United States. As one federal district judge sagely observed: "The
tobacco industry has, as of late, become the whipping-boy of American
political discourse. '33 It has happened to the tobacco industry, and it can
happen to others.
B. THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY - A PREvmw
For almost fifty years, smokers and their relatives have brought
claims against tobacco companies. Yet, they have had a very poor record
of success for several reasons. 34 One reason is the application of the
assumption of risk defense and principles of contributory negligence or
comparative fault. Despite very strong arguments by plaintiffs' attorneys
that people who smoke are "addicted" and incapable of "voluntarily" en-
countering the risks of smoking, many jurors believe that smokers under-
stood the risks related to smoking and voluntarily encountered them.
30 See Paul M. Barrett, Other Cities May Follow New Orleans In Antigun Suit, but Fight
Will Be Hard, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1998, at A16.
31 See id.; see also Miami-Dade County Votes To Sue Gun Manufacturers, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 25, 1999, at B2.
32 Some state legislatures have taken action to prevent such lawsuits. See Louisiana
Passes a Bill to Prevent Gun Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1999, at B2 ("A bill preventing
Louisiana cities from suing the gun industry was passed by the state Senate without a dissent-
ing vote Wednesday.").
33 Southeast Florida Laborers Dist. Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris,
1998 WL 186878, at 6 (S.D. Fla. April 13, 1998). The court goes on to state that "[tihe fact
that that the tobacco industry has recently become very unpopular, however, is insufficient
ground for this Court to overturn well-established common law rules ...... Id.
34 See generally GARY T. ScHwARzT, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING POL-
icy: LAw, PoLmcs, AND CuLTuRE 131 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds. 1993);
Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STANFoRD L. REv.
853 (1992).
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Another reason for the limited success smokers have had is the issue
of specific causation. Smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer, but indi-
vidual plaintiffs have not been found by juries to have proven that their
use of a particular cigarette caused their specific cancer.
Additionally, plaintiffs have lost many cases, because of the doc-
trine of federal preemption. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,35 the
United States Supreme Court held that post-1968 claims for failure to
warn were preempted by the requirements in the congressionally man-
dated "surgeon general's warning."
With tobacco becoming the scapegoat of "right thinking" people,
some creative lawyers tried to develop a way around the problems that
smokers met when they brought their individual cases. Plaintiff's attor-
neys determined that if there were a way to vest in the State or another
third party an "independent" cause of action that would not be subject to
the barriers faced by individual plaintiffs, especially with respect to as-
sumption of risk and specific causation, claims against the industry might
be successful. These attorneys also knew that "independent" actions
could aggregate the damage claims of thousands of individual smokers,
creating the specter of crushing liability.
The first wave of third party "independent" suits were brought by
State attorneys general to recoup payments relating to medical assistance
given to Medicaid recipients predicated on the allegation that those recip-
ients suffered harm because of their use of tobacco products. Cities,
union health and welfare funds, Blue Cross/Blue Shield entities, self-
insured employers, Native American Indian tribes, taxpayers, and foreign
governments then filed their own claims. Ultimately, the state attorneys
general claims were settled for a substantial amount of money.3 6
Despite the unpopularity of the defendants, most courts have fol-
lowed basic principles of law and applied the remoteness doctrine to dis-
miss these derivative claims.37 Some courts, however, bent the rules of
35 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
36 See Milo Geyelin, Top Tobacco Firms Agree to Pay States Up to $206 Billion in 25-
Year Settlement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at A3 ('The four biggest tobacco companies
agreed to pay as much as $20 billion to 46 states to settle suits seeking to recover health costs
connected to smoking.").
37 See Iowa v. Philip Morris Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401, 407 (Iowa 1998) (holding that "fail-
ure to apply the remoteness doctrine would permit unlimited suits to be filed"); Laborers Local
17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 172 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
statutory and common law claims "doomed" under traditional principles of proximate cause);
Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 934 (3d
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000) (holding that claims may not be brought except
by those who suffered direct economic loss attributable to the defendants); Oregon Laborers-
Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957 (9 t Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 789 (2000) (holding that derivative claims for injuries suffered by
smokers barred because of remoteness); City of Birmingham, Ala. v. American Tobacco Co.,
10 F. Supp.2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1998); Regence Blueshield v. Philip Morris, Inc., 40 F.
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remoteness, because of their belief in the "justness" of the result.38
Plaintiffs' lawyers provided legal talismans to help them. Nevertheless,
the following sections demonstrate that, under the traditional legal point
of view, remoteness principles apply to derivative claims against tobacco
product manufacturers.
V. APPLICATION OF THE REMOTENESS DOCTRINE TO THE
TOBACCO INDUSTRY
A. BACKGROUND
Even though the state attorneys general cases against the tobacco
industry have settled, the application of the remoteness doctrine to un-
popular defendants remains highly relevant. Health care plans, foreign
governments, and others still have actions pending against the tobacco
industry. Furthermore, the theories raised in the now-settled attorneys
general cases are very likely to be alleged in litigation involving other
products and services. Indeed, as already noted, they are already being
used in actions against the gun industry.
The healthcare reimbursement cases against the tobacco industry
have been predicated on the allegation that the plaintiffs suffered eco-
nomic loss as a result of money spent to provide medical treatment to
smokers. Many of the claims have alleged a variety of common law
theories.39 Others have been based on statutes, such as the Federal Rack-
Supp.2d 1179, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff failed to show defendant's
product was the proximate cause of their injury); International Brotherhood of Teamsters Lo-
cal 734 Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 34 F. Supp.2d. 656, 661 (N.D.
MI1. 1998) (applying the remoteness doctrine to preclude recovery); Texas Carpenters Health
Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 21 F. Supp.2d 664, 669 (E.D. Tex. 1998) ("Fundamental
principles of proximate cause dictate that plaintiffs may only recover for injuries directly suf-
fered."); Seafarers Welfare Plan v. Philip Morris, Inc., 27 F. Supp.2d 623, 635 (D. Md. 1998)
(holding that "the causal connection between the Defendants' alleged unlawful trade practices
and the Plaintiffs' alleged injury is too tenuous" to permit recovery); Hawaii Health & Welfare
Trust Fund for Operating Engineers v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 52 F. Supp.2d 1196, 1199-2000 (D.
Haw. 1999) (holding that claims for indirect economic injury were barred under the remote-
ness doctrine); Southeast Fla. Laborers Dist. Health Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, 1998
WL 186878, *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 1998) ("If courts were to ignore the law and permit recov-
ery as a matter of course against an unpopular defendant [such as the tobacco industry] for the
sole reason that the defendant is unpopular, courts would have abandoned their constitution-
ally-mandated role of interpreting the law and would have assumed the role of political institu-
tions."); New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 17 F. Supp.2d 324, 332
(D.N.J. 1998) ("As payors of medical expenses, the funds' injuries are too remote, absent a
right of subrogation, to directly sue the defendants - the alleged tortfeasors - for the health
care costs incurred due to misconduct aimed at their participants.").
38 See Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp.2d 965 (E.D. Tex. 1997); Iron Work-
ers Local Union No. 17 Insurance Fund and its Trustees v. Philip Morris Inc., 1998 WL
602033 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 1998).
39 See supra, note 37.
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eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), federal and state
antitrust laws, or state consumer protection statutes.40
Common law principles can and sometimes should be intertwined
with statutory actions. Within the maze of common law and statutory
theories lies a basic question: "Do the predicates for the remoteness doc-
trine apply in tobacco cases?" The following discussion considers each
of the factors that supports the doctrine and examines their application to
the tobacco industry.
B. ARE THERE INTERvENG Acrs BE-wEEN THE DEFENDANT's
CoNDuCT AND THE PLAwN'S Loss?
In cases where the remoteness doctrine has been applied under the
common law a number of intervening acts have occurred. For example,
consider the unusual pattern of events in Petition of Kinsman Transit
Co.41 - one ship hitting another, both going down a river, combining
with people who negligently failed to lift a drawbridge. There were a
great many distinct intervening acts that arose between the time of the
defendant's alleged negligence and the plaintiff's loss.
Tobacco cases and similar derivative actions do not involve a multi-
plicity of intervening acts; however, they do involve one major interven-
ing act: someone made the decision to smoke cigarettes. The indirect
economic losses allegedly borne by governments and health care plans
would not have occurred if an individual had not made a decision to
smoke cigarettes. The smoker is the person who has directly suffered the
harm. His or her choice to begin and continue to smoke is an "interven-
ing" cause.42
An analogy might be made to an individual who engages in high-
risk behavior in a workplace and is injured after choosing to remove a
safety guard on a machine in order to expedite production. If an em-
ployer were to try to bring a claim against the machine's manufacturer,
the employee's conduct would be regarded as an intervening act and the
employer's harm would be deemed remote.
An argument can be made that the person who chose to smoke was
or is "addicted," and, therefore, his conduct is not an intervening act.
This addiction argument, however, is more relevant to the smoker's
claim about whether he or she voluntarily assumed the risk, than it is
with respect to a party who suffered an indirect economic loss because an
40 See id.
41 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
42 See Texas Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 21 F. Supp.2d 664,
674 (E.D. Tex. 1998) ("The Court is of the opinion that the individual smokers' decisions to
smoke or to continue smoking amount to intervening factors that break the causal chain be-
tween Tobacco's conduct and the cost burdens borne by the Funds.").
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individual smoked. Although the smoker's intervening act itself may not
result in the automatic application of the remoteness doctrine, it is rele-
vant to the general issue as to whether a plaintiff's harm is too many
steps removed.
C. DUPLICATE RECOVERY FOR THE SAME HARM SHOULD BE
AVOIDED
As discussed above, application of the remoteness doctrine avoids
duplicate recoveries for what is, in essence, a single harm. To the extent
that courts allow governments or union funds to recover for costs that
could be related in some way to smoking, there is a substantial risk of
duplicate recoveries and multiple imposition of liability. Currently, there
are hundreds of cases pending on behalf of individual smokers, as well as
some class actions brought on behalf of smokers. These claims seek re-
covery for the same type of medical expenses - and in some cases the
very same medical expense dollars - that are sought by the union funds.
In the individual cases, the collateral source rule precludes a jury
from knowing that the smoker had already been paid by another source,
whether the payment came from the State, a fund, or an insurer. Because
the fund cases have in many instances "led the pack" and moved ahead
of individual smoker cases, the fact that these damages would in the fu-
ture be asserted in the smoker's case cannot be raised in the fund cases
themselves.
Despite the fact that tobacco companies have become an "outlaw"
industry in the minds of many, the overwhelming number of courts that
have faced this issue have recognized the risk of duplicate recovery for
the same harm and supported the application of the remoteness
doctrine.43
D. AVOIDING AN AVALANCHE OF CLAIMS
Within the framework of the tobacco health care reimbursement
cases, one can see the potential for an avalanche of claims. A few short
years ago, there were only a handful of State cases. The States attempted
to assert that their right of action was independent and superior to that of
43 See id. at 672 ('There can be no doubt that allowing this suit to go forward creates the
risk of duplicative liability for the same conduct."); Southeast Fla. Laborers Dist. Health Wel-
fare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 1998 WL 186878, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 1998)
("mhe risks of multiple recoveries is real."); Seafarers Welfare Plan v. Philip Morris, Inc., 27
F. Supp.2d 623, 632 (D. Md. 1998) (noting that "there is a definite risk of multiple recoveries
in this case if plaintiffs are allowed to proceed."); International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Local 734 Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 34 F. Supp.2d. 656, 662 (N.D.
Ill. 1998) (indicating that "an equally compelling basis for dismissal is the substantial risk of
double recovery posed by class action suits which could be brought by the individual members
based on their personal injuries").
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the individual smoker. As will be amplified later, the only State supreme
courts that directly addressed this issue recognized that, under the com-
mon law, subrogation principles apply (i.e., that a person or entity who
had a remote claim had to proceed through subrogation and face the
same defenses and litigation hurdles that would be met by the individual
who was directly harmed).44
Once some lower courts broke this barrier, more States filed claims.
Other plaintiffs, such as union health and welfare funds, Blue Cross/Blue
Shield, Native American Indian tribes, taxpayers, and foreign govern-
ments, filed claims too.
The avalanche will not end with tobacco. The principles that are set
forth in the opinions that might permit such claims would be equally
applicable to States or union funds that were "economically" damaged,
because their citizens or members were injured or harmed by other prod-
ucts. Courts could expand those principles to apply to manufacturers of
alcoholic beverages, who may be deemed "responsible" under such con-
cepts. It could also be true with respect to gun manufacturers, as already
reflected in the filings of lawsuits against that industry. If tort law is
extended to allow claims without consideration of the injured party's
fault - a fundamental point in the tobacco healthcare reimbursement
cases - the avalanche opens horizons whose only limit is the imagina-
tion and creative thought processes of plaintiffs' lawyers.
Consider one example: virtually all automobiles can be driven over
100 miles per hour. Some cars can be driven 130 or even 140 miles per
hour. These are illegal speeds in all States. Who does not know of a
teenager who tried to test the family car to see "just how fast it would
go"? That experience may be even more common than the number of
teenagers who "experiment" with cigarettes.
Sometimes "excessive" speed kills or maims the driver, passengers
in the vehicle, or others on the highway, resulting in health care costs
that could be quite substantial. The indirect economic cost is very real,
either to a State or insurance fund. Should automobile companies be
subject to "direct" lawsuits by such entities? Traditional remoteness
principles would say no, but the theories espoused by plaintiffs in the
tobacco healthcare reimbursement cases would suggest the contrary.
High fat foods can be a substantial health hazard. If one were per-
mitted to group defendants without having to define their individual con-
tribution to harm - an approach that has been undertaken by plaintiffs in
some tobacco healthcare reimbursement cases - fast food enterprises
that cater to children could be deemed liable to such plaintiffs.
44 See Bales v. Warren County, 478 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1991) (holding that the
plaintiff's "right to reimbursement depends on subrogation principles").
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Plaintiffs' lawyers contend that there will be no avalanche of claims,
because tobacco is the only product that causes harm when it is used "as
intended." Intended by whom and about what? Clearly those who sell
fast food intend that persons consume their products. Medical evidence
suggests that those products can harm a substantial portion of the popula-
tion when used "as intended." Although motor vehicle manufacturers do
not intend for a person to drive over 100 miles per hour, they produce a
product that easily can reach and surpass that goal. Adult beverage man-
ufacturers do not intend that their products be used to excess or con-
sumed by alcoholics, but it happens. Gun manufacturers claim, with
justification, that their products are intended for sport and self-protection,
not to harm innocent people.
The reality is that the manufacturers cannot control the use of the
product once it is sold, regardless of their intentions. More importantly,
the "used as intended" theory touted in the media has no recognition in
law. Abandonment of the remoteness doctrine and fundamental subroga-
tion principles in tobacco cases could create an avalanche of claims
against other defendants. That concern has been a major factor leading a
number of courts to retain the remoteness doctrine's limitation on
liability.
E. INDiRECT ECONOMIC HARM SUGGESTS REMOTENESS
The now-settled state attorneys general claims against tobacco prod-
ucts manufacturers were derivative, "indirect" economic loss claims.
The plaintiffs did not suffer personal injury or damage to property. The
same is true with respect to the pending fund and foreign government
claims. For nearly 200 years, tort law principles have held that indirect
economic claims are "remote" when they are derived from a direct injury
to a person.
By way of contrast, tort law recognizes the injured person's claim.
The steadfast application by courts of the remoteness principle in this
context focuses, in part, on the fact that allowing indirect economic loss
claims could dwarf and bury the rights of the individual who was directly
harmed. Courts also have recognized that allowing indirect economic
loss claims has virtually no stopping point.
Tort law has engaged in prioritization. Personal injury claims have
the highest weight and priority. Damage to property is secondary. Eco-
nomic loss runs a far third, and when the economic losses are only indi-
rect, the remoteness doctrine bars recovery. Traditional subrogation
principles protect that balance by recognizing the primacy of the claim
by the injured individual, while at the same time allowing those deriva-
tively injured a rational way to recover without the risk of creating
double recoveries or an avalanche of claims.
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F. A SUMMATION
The remoteness doctrine can be placed under the conceptual envel-
ope of "proximate cause," "standing," or "duty." No matter where the
doctrine is placed conceptually, however, the factors of intervening acts,
potential for duplicate recovery, potential for an avalanche of claims, and
the fact that the harm alleged is an indirect economic claim, suggest that
a neutral application of common law principles would bar State and for-
eign government and fund claims in tobacco cases.
A legislature could overrule the common law and create a direct
cause of action. This happened in Florida, Maryland, and Vermont.45
There also could be individual, unique State statutes construed to allow
States direct claims. Such claims raise constitutional questions that are
beyond the scope of this article. But, in the overwhelming number of
common law and statutory situations the principles that support the re-
moteness doctrine indicate that it applies to tobacco cases.46
Plaintiffs in the tobacco cases have argued that there is one aspect to
"proximiate cause" which might suggest that indirect economic loss
claims in tobacco cases are not remote - foreseeability. It is foreseeable
that if persons smoke and thereby suffer a serious illness, the smoker's
conduct and use of tobacco products could, in turn, impose a cost on
union health or welfare funds, Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, Native
American Indian tribes, taxpayers, and foreign governments. But, the
remoteness doctrine is not predicated on foreseeability.
Numerous courts have correctly recognized that, regardless of
whether analyzed under the rubric of proximate cause or duty, remote-
ness is an independent and dispositive requirement separate and apart
45 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (1999) ("Principles of common law and equity as to
assignment, lien, and subrogation are abrogated to the extent necessary to ensure full recovery
by Medicaid from third party sources."); MD. CoDE ANN., HEALTH-GaN § 15-120(e)(2) (1998)
("In any action... brought by the state against a manufacturer of a tobacco priduct, the
causation and the amount of medical assistance expenditures attributable to the use of a to-
bacco product may be proved or disproved by evidence of statistical analysis, without proof of
the causation or the amount of expenditures for any particular program recipient or any other
individual."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1904, 1911 (1998) (The cause of action by a state
against a tobacco company for tobacco related expenses "shall be a direct cause of action and
not a subrogated cause of action."). See generally Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medical Litiga-
tion: Snuffing Out the Rule of Law, 22 S. ILL. U. LJ. (arguing that recent developments in
tobacco litigation threaten our democratic system by eliminating common law principles of
evidence and causation).
46 See Southeast Florida Laborers Dist. Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris,
1998 WL 186878, at 6 (S.D. Fla. April 13, 1998) ("If courts were to ignore the law and permit
recovery as a matter of course against an unpopular defendant for the sole reason that the
defendant is unpopular, courts would have abandoned their constitutionally-mandated role of
interpreting the law and would have assumed the role of political institutions.").
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from foreseeability.47 Indeed, those derivatively injured by the conduct
of others can almost always assert that their derivative injuries were
"foreseeable." For that reason, allowing "foreseeability" to circumvent
the remoteness doctrine would be the death knell of the doctrine. Indeed,
it was quite "foreseeable" that a third party would pay the medical ex-
penses of the unfortunate pauper victimized in Anthony v. Slaid.48 By
definition, paupers are destitute and their medical expenses will necessar-
ily be borne by others. More broadly, in society today, it is always "fore-
seeable" that products which injure individuals will result in "harm" (i.e.,
payments for the injured individual's medical expenses) to insurers, gov-
ernments, employers, or others.
The principal policy public factor that argues for common law prin-
ciples and precedent to be ignored in tobacco cases, including the re-
moteness doctrine, is the heinous conduct alleged to have been
committed by the defendants. That alleged conduct creates a question
which has apparently vexed some courts: are the rules of law to be ig-
nored because of the wrongfulness of a defendant's conduct? Most
higher appellate courts have said "no."49 The greatest "tension" in this
regard has occurred in the State healthcare reimbursement cases. They
will be briefly discussed next.
VI. THE REMOTENESS DOCTRINE'S LIABILITY
LIMITATIONS AND STATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL SUITS
THE GREATEST TENSION BETWEEN THE REMOTENESS DOCTRINE AND
THE NEED BY SOME TO IMPOSE LIABILITY AGAINST UNPOPULAR DEFEND-
47 See, e.g., Iowa v. Philip Morris, 577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1998) (holding that the re-
moteness doctrine is not based upon a factual inquiry as to foreseeability or proximate cause,
but on "public policy considerations"); Oregon Laborers-Employees Health and Welfare Trust
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 17 F. Supp.2d 1170 (D. Ore. 1998) (holding that proximate cause
includes "a policy element that encompasses concepts of equity and standing (where a plaintiff
stands in relation to a defendant's harmful conduct)"); International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Local 734 Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 34 F. Supp.2d. 656, 661 (N.D.
i. 1998) (holding that "the remoteness doctrine involves public policy concerns ... com-
pletely unrelated to factual or proximate causation").
48 52 Mass. 290 (1846).
49 See Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 172 F.3d 223
(2d Cir. 1999) (holding statutory and common law claims "doomed" under traditional princi-
ples of proximate cause); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 934 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000) (holding that claims
may not be brought except by those who suffered direct economic loss attributable to the
defendants); Oregon Laborers-Employees Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Phillip Morris,
Inc. 1999 WL 493306, *9 (9 hb Cir. 1999) (holding that derivative claims for injuries suffered
by smokers barred because of remoteness). See generally THm CoMPLETE WarINas oF
THOMAS PAINE (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945) ("He that would make his own liberty secure must
guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent
that will reach to himself.").
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ANTS OCCURRED IN THE HEALTHCARE REIMBURSEMENT SUITS BROUGHT
BY STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AGAINST MANUFACTURERS OF TOBACCO
PRODUCTS. EVEN THOUGH THOSE CASES HAVE SETTLED, REMOTENESS
PRINCIPLES CONTINUE TO BE RELEVANT GIVEN THAT ATTEMPTS WILL BE
MADE TO APPLY THE NOVEL TORT THEORIES RAISED IN THE STATE TO-
BACCO CASES TO OTHER CONTEXTS.
A. STATE SUPREME COURTS UPHOLD REMOTENESS DocTRINE
In the State attorney general tobacco cases, the remoteness doctrine
was usually upheld when it was considered by State courts of last resort.
1. The Florida Decision
In light of the fact that the tobacco companies made a substantial
settlement with the State of Florida before the global settlement oc-
curred, it is surprising to learn that the Supreme Court of Florida upheld
the remoteness doctrine liability limitation. Some background may help
explain this apparent contradiction.
In 1994, the Florida legislature enacted a series of "midnight
amendments" to the Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, which
granted the State an "independent right" against tobacco and other com-
panies whose products may have caused injury to the citizens of the State
which, in turn, created costs for the State. Among other things, the legis-
lation nullified traditional common law defenses that would have applied
to the State if it had pursued its claim under the traditional common
law.50 These new amendments were challenged by both the tobacco in-
dustry and a broad coalition called the Associated Industries of Florida as
depriving defendants of basic constitutional rights.51
In the context of litigation over the Third-Party Liability Act, Flor-
ida's Attorney General argued that the legislature had not made any fun-
damental change in the law; rather, he contended, the common law of
Florida always had given the State the right to bring the sort of claims
asserted in the lawsuit. In a split decision, the Florida Supreme Court
upheld some portions of the legislation, but declared other parts
unconstitutional.5 2
50 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(1) (1998) ("Principles of common law and equity...
are abrogated to the extent necessary to ensure full recovery by Medicaid from third-party
resources.").
51 See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., 678 So. 2d 1239
(Fla. 1996).
52 The court noted that the amendment's abrogation of traditional defenses to effectuate
State policy goals had the potential to violate Florida citizen's due process rights, but found
that any such problems would arise in the application of the Act. See id. at 1243. The amend-
ments also allowed the State to proceed without identifying individual recipients of Medicaid
payments. The court found that that portion of the statute violated procedural due process.
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The entire court, however, rejected the Attorney General's argument
that an independent right to bring claims had always been part of Florida
law. Specifically, the Florida Supreme Court stated that prior to the en-
actment of the new statute, "[t]he State was given a traditional subroga-
tion action. Such an action allowed the State to occupy the same position
as a Medicaid recipient in its pursuit of third-party resources. '53 Thus,
under the law prior to the enactment of the special statute, the State's
claim would have been deemed too remote.
2. The Iowa Decision
The Supreme Court of Iowa faced the same issue, but there was no
"remedial statute" to help the State's case. Iowa's Attorney General ar-
gued that the State had independent rights which were superior to the
rights of individual smokers. Cutting through the Attorney General's ar-
guments, the court held that the State's claim was derivative in nature
and for reasons of public policy barred by the remoteness doctrine.54
The court stated that "failure to apply the remoteness doctrine would
permit unlimited suits to be filed... [and that they were] not inclined to
open the proverbial floodgates of litigation to such an extent. '55
3. The Decision of the Eastern District of Texas
One federal court that partially sustained a State healthcare reim-
bursement suit did so based on a unique expansion of the "quasi-sover-
eign" doctrine. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas applied its understanding of "quasi-sovereign" principles in al-
lowing Texas to pursue an independent claim.56 Before the Texas fed-
eral court's decision, the quasi-sovereign doctrine had been limited to
suits for injunctive relief. The Texas federal court extended the doctrine
to damage claims based on the State's claim that it had "expend[ed] mil-
lions of dollars each year in order to provide medical care to its citizens
under Medicaid", despite the fact that the court was sitting in diversity
The court also held unconstitutional the portion of the amendments that abolished Florida's
statute of repose. The court stated that such modifications only could be applied to claims that
were not yet barred by the statute of repose. The court sustained a provision that provided for
the joinder of multiple claims. The court also sustained the constitutionality of permitting
market share liability, but indicated that the legislature could not utilize market share liability
in connection with the concept of joint and several liability. Importantly, the court indicated
that the State could proceed with its new cause of action to recover payments made after the
effective date of the Act, specifically, July 1, 1994. See id. at 1256. With respect to claims
that accrued prior to the time, the State was left to the traditional subrogation action.
53 Il at 1244.
54 See Iowa v. Philip Morris, 577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1998).
55 lad at 406.
56 Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp.2d 956, 962 (E.D.Tex. 1997).
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and guessing what the common law of Texas might be.57 Previously, of
course, the amount of a plaintiff's alleged economic harm or loss had
never been a basis for overcoming either the remoteness doctrine or the
requirement that a derivative claim should be predicated on subrogation.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota clearly recognized this fact in a to-
bacco case.58
In support of its decision, the federal district court in Texas also
stated that "participating in the Medicaid program and having it operate
in an efficient and cost-effective manner improves the health and welfare
of the people of Texas." 59 The court, however, failed to address a basic
premise of tort law: allowing claims by people who are directly injured
provides sufficient deterrence to protect the health and welfare of every-
one. Mere incantation of words like "efficient" and "cost effective" is
not generally deemed sufficient to overcome longstanding legal rules.
Further, the court did not provide any careful evaluation of the pub-
lic policy reasons for finding that the "remoteness" doctrine did not ap-
ply. As indicated in this article, the reasons that the remoteness doctrine
should apply include: (1) the existence of intervening acts between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury; (2) the possibility of dupli-
cate recovery for the same harm; (3) the potential for an avalanche of
claims; and (4) the fact that tort law disfavors indirect economic harm
claims. None of these factors are ameliorated by the State's "quasi-sov-
ereign" status.
Predictably, the decision of the federal court in Texas started an
avalanche of claims. Other attorneys general relied upon the theory.
Plaintiffs' lawyers likewise embraced the court's "quasi-sovereign" the-
ory on behalf of foreign countries such as the Republics of Guatemala,
Panama and Nicaragua, and can be expected to do so in other lawsuits by
foreign countries. What public entities will be next?
In rendering its decision, the federal court in Texas distinguished
the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Standard
Oil of California,60 which held that the Federal Government could not
recover funds it expended to treat a soldier by way of a direct, independ-
ent cause of action against the defendant who caused that harm.61 The
57 Id. at 962.
58 See Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490,495 (Minn. 1996) (concluding
in a case involving Blue Cross that the "injury, albeit substantial.... is simply too remote").
59 Texas v. American Tobacco, 14 F. Supp.2d at 964.
60 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
61 See id.; see also District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (stating that absent authorizing legislation, the costs of public protection from safety
hazards should be borne by society as a whole, not by the tortfeasor whose act allegedly
created the need for the service); City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co.,
719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating the same principle).
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federal district court in Texas observed, correctly, that the "quasi-sover-
eign doctrine" had never been deemed to be a basis for a suit brought by
the Federal Government.
In a rather stunning example of reverse logic, however, the court
contended that the United States Supreme Court's holding was inapplica-
ble because the Texas case involved a State. Yet, the law clearly estab-
lishes that no such right is conferred upon the federal government in this
circumstance. That reasoning would apply a fortiori to foreign govern-
ments and logically should apply to State governments as well.
The federal court in Texas also argued that the Standard Oil case
was inapposite, because the United States was not seeking an independ-
ent claim on behalf of the populace. Nothing in the Supreme Court's
opinion in Standard Oil, however, suggested that its principles were re-
lated to the number of people harmed.
Contrary to the Texas district court's decision, if the quasi-sover-
eign doctrine is to have any underpinning in precedent or logic, it is not
to give the State an independent right to bring tort claims for damages.
The doctrine should be limited to allowing States to obtain injunctive
relief to prevent harm. There may be unique State statutes which a court
may interpret to give a State greater rights against tobacco or other un-
popular defendants than is or was possessed by people who have suffered
direct physical injury, but common law'principles underlying the remote-
ness doctrine do not allow for such a distinction.
VII. CONCLUSION
The basic fiber of American tort law is tested by the unpopular de-
fendant. It is understandable that some judges may feel tempted to mod-
ify or change principles of law where allegations suggest that the
defendant has engaged in a course of action that has been harmful to
society. The judge is then confronted with a basic dilemma. Does he or
she bend the law to reach a result? Does the end justify the means?
A judge's answer to this dilemma in the context of tobacco and
derivative cases is not an easy one. On the one hand, the remoteness
doctrine has both a long history and a clear, concise rationale. This arti-
cle, in describing that rationale, is meant to be of assistance to judges in
their attempt to measure whether the law should be changed because of a
particular defendant's wrongful conduct. If one can stand back from the
controversial cases and make objective judgments - judgments about
the shape of the law and its rationale - the remoteness doctrine has
clear, strong public policy bases that would continue to apply in a myriad
of contexts. The toughest issue is whether it should simply be put aside
for some defendants. The basic principle of equal justice under law
strongly suggests that it should not.
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